

DRAFT
7 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Cord Meyer, Jr., SA/DDCI
SUBJECT : Crisis Management

1. In accord with the Director's 16 August instruction, we have reviewed the Community-level and Agency procedures for national intelligence support in crises situations. We have concluded that the existing formal mechanisms (NIO coordination, Alert Memorandum, CRITIC procedures, the arrangements for production of a National Intelligence Situation Report, and NOIWON conferencing) are sound and should be continued. We found that there are some additional measures that could be taken that would significantly improve the DCI's control over the Intelligence Community during crises and would enable him to provide more effective national intelligence support to foreign policy and military crises responses. I suggest that you, Dick Lehman, and the four DD's and I meet to discuss the measures described in the following paragraphs and the attachment.

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2. In reviewing Community actions in recent minor crises, we noted the essentially ad hoc and piecemeal nature of decisions on how to organize intelligence resources to cope with each crisis. As has been noted in various post-mortems, the delays and confusion that this causes detracts from quick and effective marshalling of our collection and analytic resources. Without inhibiting flexibility we believe that a more deliberate approach to considering actions to be taken during crises could reduce unnecessary delay and confusion. To this end, we have developed the attached Checklist of Intelligence Community Actions During Crises. This Checklist identifies specific actions to be considered in any crisis situation and assigns responsibility for them. The actions described are not mandatory, but are those that should be considered in each crisis situation. You will note that the draft Checklist contains both Community-level and internal CIA procedures, but in accordance with the DCI's guidance we have not at this stage attempted to seek coordination outside the Agency.

3. The Checklist assumes the existence of three positions that do not currently exist: a Community Crisis Collection Coordinator, a DCI Representative to a State Department Interagency Crisis Task Force (when established) and a DCI Representative to JCS crisis planning groups, when they are established.

4. Our working group is unanimously agreed that there is a need for a Community Crisis Collection Coordinator who would keep the DCI

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and the NIO fully informed on Community collection activities, capabilities, and options during a crisis, who would work with the NIO and the Collection Managers (DDO, NSA, Defense Attaches, FBIS, COMIREX Staff, etc.) to insure that collection efforts are quickly focused on key policy decision options and support to U. S. actions during a crisis, and who would serve as the national intelligence interface with the Pentagon's Collection Coordination Facility.

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by virtue of his name
We are also persuaded that this is a full-time job as the Coordinator could only carry out his crisis responsibilities by careful study of our intelligence capabilities, organizations and procedures and the establishment of the necessary relationships and understandings with Community components during non-crisis periods. We are less certain where the Coordinator should come from and what organizational niche he should occupy. We have agreed on three options and I am prepared to discuss the pros and cons of each when we meet. These options are:

- a. A member of the NIO Staff.
- b. A member of the IC Staff.
- c. An additional duty for the Chief of the CIA Operations Center.

5. A DCI Representative to the State Department Interagency Crisis Task Force (when such a Task Force is established) could coordinate Community actions with the Department, and improve communications between the Department and the Community in conveying State's

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
intelligence needs and providing prompt intelligence tailored to those needs. NIO and DDO representation has been provided to State in recent crises with mixed effect. Placing these ad hoc arrangements on a more formal basis may lend more weight to a DCI presence in Departmental crisis groups. We believe that this representative can be selected according to the needs of a specific crisis, but that the Department needs formal notice that such a representative would probably be provided in a crisis to carry out specified tasks.

6. A DCI Representative to JCS crisis planning groups should be designated as an individual who would work with the Joint Staff to improve communications between the JCS and the Intelligence Community, to improve national intelligence support to military planning and operations during a crisis, and to keep the DCI and the Community informed of U.S. military actions so that support can be provided and better analysis of foreign reactions can be made. This has been a weakness in our relations with the Pentagon in several crises and is an area where the Director can take initiatives to improve our relationships. We do not believe this to be a full-time job. [redacted] *to have access to*
SAK themselves.

7. I wish to thank the members of our working group for their valuable contribution to this task. They are:

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Cord Meyer, Jr.

Attachment: Checklist

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2			
3	<i>Algeria</i>		
4	<i>Crisis management</i>		
5	<i>file</i>		
6	<i>delivered to Meyer</i>		
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Please let me know by phone by COB Friday, 8 October, if you have any changes to suggest in the attached covering memorandum.

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Cord Meyer, Jr.

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